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Proclus and the Forty Logoi of Zeno'
JOHN DILLON
At a number of places in his Commentary on the Parmenides, Proclus
seems to show knowledge of a treatise of Zeno of Elea's which is not
derivable from the text of the Parmenides, and the inference seems
possible that he has access to a document, whether genuine or
otherwise, purporting to be the original book of Zeno.
I propose in this article, first, to present all the references which
Proclus makes to Zeno's treatise, to see how many of them are
susceptible to such an interpretation, and then to draw some general
conclusions.
(1) At 619.30-620.3 Cousin, Proclus introduces us to Zeno's treatise:
'0 bi} Tov Ilapnevidov nadrjrfiq Zffvoiv avrodev nev Trwq to) tov StSacr/caXou
bbytiaTi avprjyopetv ov ^ovXbueuoq,, u)c, ov8h tov doyfiaroc, deonevov Tziartcjiq
aXX-qq,, ^orjOtiav de Tiua iropi^eiv KeKpvfinivrjv e-KiX'^iplhv
,
ypa(t>€i ti ^L0\iov, eV
« dainovicoq ideiKVvev ovk ikotTTui ivbmva dvaxf^PV rolq iroWa toc ovra Tidipkvoic,
7] oca Tolq ep to ov eLprjKomv eSo^ev onravTOV Koi yap 6p,otov KOii avbuoiov
TovTOv ibeiKW Koa UTOv Kot aviaov iabiieuov, kol iraaav bcTrXdc, avaipemv Trie,
t6c^€(i3c, twu ovTCiiv KOil TTCiVTwu eaopivqv avyxvarLi' irXtifiixeXfi.
Now Zeno, Parmenides' disciple, did not care to plead directly for his
master's doctrine, since he thought it needed no additional confir-
mation, but attempted to give it secret aid by writing a book in which
he ingeniously showed that those who suppose that beings are many
encountered no fewer difficulties than were alleged against those who
say Being is one. For he showed that the same thing will be both like
and unlike, both equal and unequal, and in general that there will
*I am most grateful to Jonathan Barnes for various helpful comments.
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result the abolition of all order in the world, and that everything will
be thrown into confusion.
Everything that Proclus states here is derivable from Plato's Parmen-
ides, 127d-128e, except the statement at the end that Zeno showed
that the same thing will be, not only "like and unlike," but "equal
and unequal" {loov koX avLoov). One might say that this is an easy
extrapolation from "like and unlike" (and that the final remark about
"the abolition of all order in the world" is likewise a natural deduction
from the text); but it need not be, and I think it may be regarded
as a straw in the wind.
(2) At 684.21-26, Proclus refers to Zeno's treatise as follows:
ToioOroq 6 Zr}voiiv icra)(; n\v Koii to; aoinari "x«P^€^ k-^u. evnr)KT](;," ttoXXo) 8e
irXtov Kara Tovq Xbyovc; oaa yap b Jlapntvibrjq ayKvXu}!; koI avviaTzapatihxaq
oiTTicpdiyyeTO, ravra 6ci>eXiTT(i}v ovroc, koo, tic, •Kap.nijKac, \byovc, iKTeivu)v irapebibov.
Such was Zeno, perhaps, in bodily appearance, "handsome and tall,"
but far more so in respect of his discourse {Xoyoi). For what Parmenides
had uttered in an intricate and terse style, Zeno unfolds and transmits
in a rather extended discourse {eic, iranfif)Kaq Xbyovq iKTeipuv).
There is nothing here, certainly, that could not be derived from the
text, though the adjective iramxrjKrjq is quite emphatic.
(3) The next substantive reference occurs at 694. 23 ff. (= 29A15
D-K), in connection with Socrates' questioning of Zeno:
IloXXoiiv 6' eiprjueucov virb tov ZrfVdiuoq Xbyoiv, kou. TeTTapaKOura tCop iravTOJU, . . .
Zeno had put forth many arguments, /or^y in all.*
He then reports the first one, in terms entirely derivable from the
text of the dialogue. Further down, however, he makes some remarks
which would seem more natural if he had a text of Zeno in front of
him. At 696.8-11 he says
nScpv Kot avurfprjuevoic, Koi aa^Oic, i^edeTO tov 5Xov Xbyov tov irpbc, ttjv virbdeoLV,
Tr}v irpuiTTiv vvbdeaLV aKpL^dq KaTavofjaaq Koi Otaaap,evoc, ti to TiXoc, icTi tov
iravTOc, Xbyov. . . .
Socrates has set forth the whole argument quite succinctly and clearly,
' Noted by Diels-Kranz (19A2), and by H. D. P. Lee in his collection of the
fragments, Zeno of Elea (Cambridge 1936), p. 7, but neither of these authorities
appears to have probed any further into the Parmenides Commentary.
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having accurately identified the first hypothesis, and seen the purpose
of the argument as a whole;
and then at 696.16-18:
Koi irapa lilv tQ) Zffuwvi tovtwv haarov dptirai bia iroXXuv, . . .
Zeno has developed each of these parts at length {6ia iroXKuv).
Both of the latter remarks could, certainly, be deductions from the
text of the dialogue (e.g. 128b2), but they are more naturally, I think,
taken as the statements of someone who is comparing one text with
another. As for the detail that the logoi amounted to forty, Proclus
here is our earliest authority for this. Our only other authority, the
sixth-century commentator Elias (also 29A1 5 D-K) gives no indication
of deriving his information from Proclus, and may thus be regarded
as an independent source.
(4) At 696.28 f. we have a reference to
. . . dLCK re TOVTOiv koi tuv aWcov tov Zfjvcovoc, Xoyuv
this and Zeno's other arguments,
which seems to indicate Proclus' acquaintance with a series of them.
(5) More substantially, in Book 11.725.22-39, we find a passage where
an argument of Zeno's against plurality is given which could not be
derived from the text. In Plato's text we simply have the statement
that, if things are many, they must be both like and unlike. We have
no indication how Zeno argued for this conclusion, or what he meant
by it. Proclus explains this as follows (29-39):
Et' apa TToXXa eariv kvoc, aixkroxot, KaB' ev hi] tovto, ttjv afiedi^uxv X€7a; tov
evoq, Koi Ofioia earai Koi avbuoia, Lie, nlv koivov ocvto exovra 5p.oia, ioc, de nrj
(XOfra avbuoia- bibri nlv yap ocvto tovto Treiropdi to evbc, nv ^erexetJ', avbp,oia
eoTTf biOTi hi KOIVOV ocvTolc, TO nrfdev ex^iv koivov, 5p.oia ioTiv, oxTTe to. ocvtoc kou.
Ofioia Koci avbp,oia. toTiv okoic, yap avTO to firjbev ex^i-f kolvov, avTO KOivbv cffTiJ'
avTolc,, axTTt avToq iavTOv b Xbyoc, aw^priKe. . . .
[In essence] If things are many, they will be unlike one another, since
they will have no share in unity or sameness; but they will also be
like, in that they will possess the common characteristic of not partici-
pating in any "one" (characteristic).
The terminology which Proclus employs here is certainly not
primitive (talk of "participation" is hardly Zenonian), but the basic
argument surely is. Indeed, using "like and unlike" as if they described
attributes of a subject would be absurdly primitive at any time after
logic had been developed in the Academy and Peripatos (unless we
are dealing with a very sophisticated forger). The argument can only
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be effective at a time before the logic of predication was understood.
I would suggest, therefore, that Proclus had before him a document
which, however reworked, is of Zenonian origin.
(6) At 760.25-761.3, o propos of 129b6-8, we find the following:
MfTor TOiiq irepl oiioiottjtoc, koL avofiOibrriTOc, Xbyovq iirl to ev /cm to irXridoc,
H(Ta^€0riK( iraXiv, Koi ravra airb tCov Zfjvojvoq Xoyuip Xa^dv. (.khvoc, br] yap
Kadairtp to ovto 8hkpv<; Snoiov koi avonoiov diJiXeyx^ toix; to. iroXXa x^pi-^ovTac,
Tov evoq, Tov ocvTOv TpoTTOv Kcix aTTO Tov €ubq Koi airb Tov irXfidovc, iirLX^Lpo^v
di-qycovi^eTO irpbc, ocvTOvq, airo(f>aiv(t}v 5ti ((/cara) Tb cscoto kou TrXriOoc, ecTTui kol
ip Tce iroXXa x^ph tov ivbc; to. yap ovTOjq exovTa irXr^dtj KaT outo to p.r)
p.iTex'ti-v ivaboc, Kca iroXka tOTV . . . Tb yap kolvov tivoc, fieTeiXrjxbc, ep eVn KaT'
avTb TOVTO TO KOivbv, (jJCTe el kolvov avTolq Tb ovx «', elxTai ev to. iroXXa KaTO.
TO ovx «' K^oci ttocXlv Tb ovx «'' aJO-auTOjq ev to? ev iramv etvai tovtov.
After the words about likeness and unlikeness, he shifts back to unity
and plurality, drawing upon Zeno's own discourse {koi Tavra airb tojj/
Zt]vcovoc, Xoyojv Xa^dv). For just as Zeno had refuted those who separate
the Many from the One by showing that Likeness and Unlikeness
become the same, so likewise he argues against them by starting from
the One and from Plurality, and shows that apart from the One the
same thing will be many and the many one. For a Plurality apart from
the One is a many by the very fact that it does not partake of unity,
for what is not controlled by unity is many. And since they have in
common their not being one, they will be one by this very fact, for
things that share a character in common are one by virtue of this
common character. So that if not being one is common to them, the
many will be one by virtue of not being one; and inversely their not
being one will be one because it is present in them all.
Once again, Proclus professes to be checking the course of the
argument in Plato's dialogue off against the sequence of arguments
in Zeno's original work. The argument presented is similar to the
one presented above about like and unlike, and presupposes a similar
level of logical primitiveness, when one has abstracted the later
(Procline?) terminology of participation.^
(7) At 769.22-770.1, a propos of Socrates' mention of Rest and
Motion at 129el, we find the following:^
^ The manuscript tradition, by the way, both Greek and Latin (Moerbeke's
translation) becomes confused at 76L2-3 Cousin, as is perceived by Chaignet in his
translation (p. 218). For /cm tvoXlv to ovx *" waaurciJ^ iv tw ev iraaiv [ovk] tivai Todnbv/et
omne quod non unum eodem modo in eo quod unum omnibus inest idem (rendering /cat kcw
to ovx iv i}aavT(j3Q, iv tu ev waaiv ivelvai tovtov?), we should read /cai iraXiv to ovx i"
loaavTftic, ev, tw iv iraaiv etvai tovtov, since what we need is "and inversely their not
being one will be one, because it is present in them all."
' This passage I have discussed already in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie 58
(1976). 221-22.
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Kpoaidr]K(^ yap 8fi ravra rate, eipriniuaic, trv^vyiau;- (ird kocv 6 Zfivuip, ov novov
i^ (Keivoiv, aXKa kol eK T^q tovtojv ocKoXovdiaq airr^Xeyx^ ''V ocTOTriav TUiv ra
iroXXa Tov kvoc, X'^P'-^v'^v- ov yap p,bvov « tov bfioiov Kal auonoiov iircn-oirfTO
Tr)v iinx'^ip-qaiv, ovbl av nbvov Ik tov ivbc, Koi tov irXr^Bovq, aXX ribt] Koii airb
(TTOtaeijiq Koi Kivrjatuiq. To yap ovto koi kutoc to avTO koi ioTayitvov kolI
Kivovtitvov aire4)j]vev, «' to. iroXXa ixfi nerexoi tov ivbc; irav to iaTap,€vov ev tivl
tOTiv evl, Koi irav to nvovnevov e^ioTaTai tov evbq, oicFTt to. KoXXa a nfj neT^xoi
Tivbq evbq aoTaTa ioTr koi -KciXiv «' ovto tovto exot KOivbv to n-q niTiX'^'-v Tt-vbq,
€v TivL eaTar TavTrj odv iraXiv aKivr\Ta- Ta ovtoi apa koH nvov/j-eva iOTai koi
iaTorra- ovk apa ttoXXq; eVTU/ iprjfia vavTT] tov evbq. 'AXX' 6 p.tv Zrjvoivoq Xbyoq
Kal ivTavOa TOiovToq- . .
.
These last two (sc. Rest and Motion) he has added to the pairs
previously mentioned, since Zeno also had used them as well as the
former pairs to prove the absurdity of separating the Many from the
One. Zeno's refutation has been based not only on Likeness and
Unlikeness, Unity and Plurality, but also on Rest and Motion. He
showed that if the Many does not participate in Unity, it follows that
the same thing in the same respect will be both at rest and in motion.
For everything at rest is in a one something («/ Tivi ioTiv ivi), and
everything that is in motion is departing from some one (position); so
that if the Many do not share in a Unity, they will be unresting; and
again, if they have in common the character of not sharing in some
Unity, they will be in some one (state); hence again will be unmoving.
The same things, therefore, will be moving and at rest; so that the
Many are not altogether devoid of Unity. Such was Zeno's argument.
This argument uses the ambiguity of the expression iv hi, which can
be taken to mean "in a place," "in a state," or "in a position," to
construct an argument of similar form to the previous ones.
(8) At 862.26-34, while commenting on Socrates' attempted analogy
of the daylight (131b3) Proclus says:
K(xi OTL nh eK TOV Zf)V(i}voq Xbyov Tb irapabeiyna eiXri())e, briXov eKeiPoq yap
brfXuiaai ^ovXbp,tvoq oir(t)q Tct iroXXa fifTix^L Tivbq ivbq, . . .kocv a buioTrfKei
KoppoiTaToi air' aXXifXcou, eiirev tv tw eavTOv Xby<j) piav ovaav tt)v XevKbTrjTa
irapdvai Kal t)ijuv Kal Tolq diVTiTzoaiv ovToiq, coq Tr)v €v<t>pbvriv Kal tt)v ijnepap.
It is clear that he has taken his example from the discourse of Zeno;
for Zeno, in his endeavor to show that the Many participate in some
One, and are not devoid of One, even though greatly separated from
each other, has said in his discourse that whiteness, which is one, is
present both to us and to the antipodes, just as night and day are.
This passage has a number of interesting aspects, which I have
discussed in an earlier article,'' but which may be repeated now. The
" "New Evidence on Zeno of Elea," AGPh 56 (1974), 127-31.
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point of the argument was presumably that "white" is taken to be
"one thing," and yet the many say that there are many white things,
so that, "if there are many," "white," which is one, would have to be
in various different places at once. The Antipodes are brought in, I
assume, as being the most remote people from us, but they are a
strange and notable feature, since, if Zeno really mentioned them,
this would be their earliest attested occurrence. Certainly, the form
of the argument, with its ignorance of predication, is primitive enough
to be Presocratic.
(9) In Book V, 1024.12 f. Proclus tells us that Zeno used to call some
of his arguments "true" and others "tactical," or "useful for the
purpose at hand" (xpficiSetq). This detail seems to be recorded
nowhere else, but on the other hand it is hardly the sort of thing
that Zeno would admit in the course of presenting his Forty Logoi,
so I would not wish to claim it as a further testimonium to that work.
This seems to complete the references to Zeno's work which are
not clearly derivable from the text of Plato. What are we to make
of them? And how is this work that Proclus talks of to be related to
that which was available later to Simplicius? I see no reason that the
arguments should not come from the same work as was available to
Simplicius, at least in respect of the arguments he quotes against
Plurality (there seems to have been a separate treatise against the
possibility of motion, cf. Zeno A15 D-K). If these seem puerile in
comparison to those, then we may perhaps take refuge in Zeno's own
reported distinction, just mentioned above, between Logoi that are
a\r}6elq and those that are xpti'i^Sf^- To quote Jonathan Barnes:
Many modern interpreters of Zeno have argued that such and such
an account of a paradox is wrong because it attributes such a silly
fallacy to a profound mind. Zeno was not profound: he was clever.
Some profundities fall from his pen; but so too did some trifling
fallacies. And that is what we should expect from an eristic disputant.
If we meet a deep argument, we may rejoice; if we are dazzled by a
superficial glitter, we are not bound to search for a nugget of
philosophical gold. Fair metal and base, in roughly equal proportions,
make the Zenonian alloy.-'
I quote this eloquent passage with a certain relish, since Barnes
does not accept the genuineness of (7) and (8) above. ^ He may be
right, but he is also right to suggest that philosophical naivete need
not be a bar to genuineness. Furthermore, all Greek thinkers were
' The Presocratic Philosophers I (London 1979), pp. 236-37.
^ Ibid., p. 236, note 8.
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prepared to throw bad arguments as well as good at a thesis in the
hope that something would stick. It did not necessarily mean that
they were persuaded by the arguments themselves.
Barnes states just below: "We do not know how Zeno argues for
the proposition (a) 'If P, then everything is alike, and (b) if P, then
everything is unlike'."^ I suggest that we do, and that it is contained
in passage (5) above.
My conclusion is that Proclus certainly had a document in his
possession called the Forty Logoi of Zeno, or something such—
probably, though not certainly, the same document that was available
to Simplicius a century later—and it seems possible to me that it at
least contained genuine material, though perhaps worked over at a
later date, or even incorporated from another, genuine source, into
a pseudepigraphic work.
Trinity College, Dublin
^ Ibid., p. 237.
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